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1 Introduction
This chapter examines Russell’s developing views—roughly from 1911 to 1918—
on the nature of introspective knowledge and subjects’ most basic knowledge of 
themselves as themselves. One reason for doing so is that the details of Russell’s 
views on introspection have largely been neglected or misunderstood, despite 
the sizeable interest in his epistemology and metaphysics of the self. Another 
reason is that doing so helps shed additional light on other aspects of his thought 
at the time, such as his broader acquaintance-based theory of knowledge, his 
preference for logical constructions over inferred entities, and his gradual 
progression toward neutral monism. This chapter argues that Russell’s theory of 
introspection distinguishes between direct awareness of individual psychological 
objects, the presentation of psychological complexes involving those objects, 
and introspective judgments that aim to correspond to them. It also explores 
his transition from believing subjects enjoy introspective self-acquaintance, to 
believing they only know of themselves by self-description, and eventually to 
believing that self-knowledge is a logical construction. It concludes by sketching, 
in broad outline, how Russell’s views about introspection and self-knowledge 
change as a result of his adoption of neutral monism.
2 Knowing things and knowing truths
Russell’s early views (from around 1911 to 1913) about introspective knowledge 
and self-knowledge center on his well-known notion of knowledge by 
acquaintance. Because there are many misconceptions about its nature and role 
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in Russell’s theory of knowledge, this section briefly considers how it fits into 
his overall epistemology. While some of the elements of his view appear earlier, 
it achieves its fullest articulation in his 1911 “Knowledge by Acquaintance and 
Knowledge by Description” (hereafter KAKD), 1912 The Problems of Philosophy 
(hereafter POP), and abandoned 1913 Theory of Knowledge manuscript (hereafter 
TK). Thus, they are the primary focus of this discussion.
In these works, Russell’s theory of knowledge—inspired by the writings 
of William James (1890/1950)—draws a fundamental distinction between 
knowledge of things and knowledge of truths. Like James, Russell sees this 
distinction as corresponding imperfectly with an ordinary distinction drawn in 
many natural languages, including French and German, between two uses of the 
term “know” (POP, 69–70).1 We sometimes talk about a subject knowing that 
such and such is the case regarding some subject matter, but we also talk about 
a subject simply knowing of a person, place, or thing, either by encountering 
it firsthand or in virtue of some less direct informational connection to it. 
However, many interpreters have pointed out that Russell’s theory of knowledge 
departs from ordinary usage in numerous ways (Bostock 2012; Crane 2012; 
Kremer 2015).
There is a great deal of ongoing controversy concerning how exactly Russell 
understands these two kinds of knowledge and their relationship to one another. 
As I interpret him, a subject has knowledge of a thing if and only if the subject 
is in some way aware of it such that he or she is in a position to think and 
talk about it.2 In contrast, a subject has knowledge of truths about something 
if and only if the subject bears a cognitive attitude toward it which can be 
evaluated in terms of truth or falsity (or success conditions more generally). 
Paradigmatically, such knowledge involves conceptually articulated beliefs and 
is propositional (or multiple-relational) in character. Knowledge of truths does 
not, however, require the exercise of reflective judgment or reasoning, as it 
often involves “instinctive,” “psychological,” or “physiological” judgments and 
inferences.
For Russell, there are two ways a subject can have knowledge of something. 
Subjects can know of something by becoming directly aware of it “without 
the intermediary of any process of inference or any knowledge of truths” 
because it is presented to them in experience (POP, 73). Russell calls this 
kind of knowledge of things knowledge by acquaintance. Alternatively, 
subjects can know of something indirectly in cases where “in virtue of some 
general principle, the existence of a thing answering to this description can be 
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inferred from the existence of something with which [they are] acquainted” 
(POP, 71). Russell calls this kind of knowledge of things knowledge by 
description.3
During this period, Russell conceives of acquaintance as a special epistemic 
relation holding between two distinct relata, where one constituent of the 
relational fact is a mental subject and another is an object of the subject’s 
awareness. In TK, he identifies this epistemic relation with direct experiential 
awareness:
Now, since we have decided that experience is constituted by a relation, . . . we 
shall employ synonymously the two words “acquaintance” and “awareness,” 
generally the former. Thus when A experiences an object O, we shall say that A 
is acquainted with O. (35)
Russell holds that acquaintance is “the simplest and most pervading aspect 
of experience. .  .  . All cognitive relations—attention, sensation, memory, 
imagination, believing, disbelieving, etc.—presuppose acquaintance” (TK, 5).4 
In fact, he maintains, “the faculty of being acquainted with things other than 
itself is the main characteristic of a mind. Acquaintance with objects essentially 
consists in a relation between the mind and something other than the mind; it is 
this that constitutes the mind’s power of knowing things” (POP, 66–67). Indeed, 
Russell follows Brentano (1874/2009) and James (1890/1950) in thinking it vital 
to draw a distinction between the psychological acts involving acquaintance and 
the objects toward which those acts are directed.5
At this time, Russell holds that subjects can be acquainted with relatively 
few kinds of mind-independent objects. Through sensation, subjects can be 
acquainted with external “sense-data” consisting of particular sensible objects, 
qualities, and relations presented within the egocentric space of their sensory 
experience (POP, 12 and 29–31).6 Through memory, subjects can be acquainted 
with previously experienced sense-data as well as various temporal relations 
(POP, 76). Through imagination, subjects can be acquainted with sense-data 
that need not be experienced as having occurred at any time whatsoever (TK, 
59–63).7 And through conceiving, subjects can be acquainted with abstract 
universals and general principles, including the objects and relations of logic 
(POP, 81; TK, 97–101).8
When it comes to the relationship between knowing objects by acquaintance 
and knowing truths about them, there is compelling (though controversial) 
evidence that Russell endorses what Proops (2014) calls “the independence 
thesis.”9 According to the independence thesis, a subject’s possession of 
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knowledge of something by acquaintance neither presupposes nor entails that 
the subject knows any truths about it. In one clear statement of this thesis, 
Russell asserts:
Knowledge of things, when it is of the kind we call knowledge by acquaintance, 
is essentially simpler than any knowledge of truths, and logically independent of 
knowledge of truths, though it would be rash to assume that human beings ever, 
in fact, have acquaintance with things without at the same time knowing some 
truth about them. (POP, 72)
Later in POP, he reiterates this claim:
We may have knowledge of a thing by acquaintance even if we know very few 
propositions about it—theoretically we need not know any propositions about 
it. (225, emphasis added)10
In contrast, a subject’s possession of knowledge of something by description 
requires “as its source and grounds” antecedent possession of knowledge of 
truths about objects of his or her acquaintance, including truths about general 
principles (POP, 73).
Many take Russell’s theory of knowledge to be motivated largely by a 
Cartesian quest for certainty. Such readings appear to be supported by his claims 
that subjects know the objects of acquaintance “perfectly and completely” and 
“just as they are” such that “no further knowledge of [them] is even theoretically 
possible” (POP, 73–74). Russell also says that it is not possible, without absurdity, 
to doubt the existence of such objects and that there is “no error involved” 
even in dreams or hallucinations unless subjects “go beyond the immediate 
object” (POP, 74, 172, and 235). These and other passages lead many to read 
him as holding that subjects can (at least sometimes) acquire absolutely certain 
knowledge about the existence, identity, features, and/or nature of the objects of 
immediate acquaintance.11
As I have argued elsewhere, there is strong evidence that such Cartesian 
interpretations are misguided.12 However, it is beyond the scope of the present 
chapter to rehearse those arguments. Instead, I will simply point to Russell’s 
remarks that “it is of course possible that all or any of our beliefs may be 
mistaken, and therefore all ought to be held with at least some slight element 
of doubt” and that “a theory which ignored this fact would be clearly wrong” 
(POP, 39–40 and 210). In any event, one should not uncritically presume that 
Russell’s accounts of introspection and self-knowledge are motivated by broader 
Cartesian concerns.
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But what then is motivating Russell’s acquaintance-based epistemology during 
this period? As Hyton (2003) notes, one of the main factors is his commitment 
to direct realism—the view that subjects can attain direct empirical knowledge 
of mind-independent reality without the mediation of conceptual structures 
(such as mental contents, ideas, or Sinne). Russell sees such direct realism 
as essential for challenging the Monistic Idealist claim that the conceptual 
structure of human thought modifies all empirical knowledge so that it provides 
only imperfect, partial, and at best approximately “true” knowledge of Absolute 
Reality (Hylton 2003, 207–09).
Russell also sees it as necessary for explaining how human thought (and 
talk) can manage to connect up with, and provide piecemeal knowledge 
about, mind-independent reality. Indeed, at this time he is committed to what 
is often called Russell’s Principle, according to which “every proposition which 
we can understand must be composed wholly of constituents with which we are 
acquainted” (POP, 58). In defense of this thesis, he insists that “it is scarcely 
conceivable that we can make a judgement or entertain a supposition without 
knowing what it is that we are judging or supposing about. We must attach 
some meaning to the words we use, if we are to speak significantly and not 
utter mere noise” (POP, 91). Thus, the job of acquaintance is to determine 
(and put subjects in a position to know) the reference of thought at its most 
fundamental level, and thereby to supply subjects with the materials needed 
for thinking indirectly about the world beyond their personal experience 
(as well as about putative entities which do not, in fact, exist). In addition, 
Russell maintains that an acquaintance-based theory of knowledge is 
required for giving an adequate analysis of various cognitive phenomena 
such as consciousness, attention, belief, memory, imagination, and selectively 
based egocentric and demonstrative thought, among others (TK, 5, 31–32, 
and 39–41).
3 Knowing the mind by acquaintance
Though much of Russell’s interest around 1911 to 1913 concerns how subjects 
are able to acquire knowledge of, and about, the mind-independent objects of 
sensation, memory, and conception, he also seeks to explain how they can have 
knowledge concerning the mind itself. As with the other sources of knowledge, 
his account is ultimately based on subjects having direct awareness of their 
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psychological episodes through a distinctive form of introspective acquaintance. 
In POP, he introduces it as follows:
We are not only aware of things, but we are often aware of being aware of them. 
When I see the sun, I am often aware of my seeing the sun; thus “my seeing the 
sun” is an object with which I have acquaintance. When I desire food, I may be 
aware of my desire for food; thus “my desiring food” is an object with which I 
am acquainted. Similarly we may be aware of our feeling pleasure or pain, and 
generally of the events which happen in our minds. (76–77)
Elsewhere, he says subjects can be introspectively acquainted with their own 
acts of sensation, attention, memory, imagination, believing, disbelieving, 
feeling, desiring, and willing, among others (POP, 80; TK, 5 and 34). When it 
comes to the minds of other people, in contrast, subjects can only know them by 
description based on indirect sensory evidence of others’ verbal and nonverbal 
behavior and similarity to themselves.
Russell appeals to a number of different considerations in making the case 
for subjects having introspective acquaintance with their own minds. To begin 
with, he thinks it is supported by an argument to the best explanation of how 
knowledge concerning minds is possible at all. Given that subjects are not 
acquainted with the minds of others, he argues, such knowledge must be based 
largely on their acquaintance with their own minds. Without such awareness, 
he maintains, subjects would not be in a position to understand the minds of 
others even by description. Consequently, “we should be unable to imagine the 
minds of others, and therefore we could never arrive at the knowledge that they 
have minds” (POP, 77). In fact, he questions whether subjects could know they 
have minds—or so much as consider whether they exist—if not for introspective 
acquaintance (POP, 78).13
In addition, Russell takes the existence of introspective acquaintance to be an 
“obvious” or “plain” fact of experience (POP, 76–77, KAKD, 110, and TK, 33). In 
fact, he admits to not knowing how to prove it, “for I cannot think of anything 
more evident” (TK, 31). His only (slight) hesitation concerns its relational 
character, since neutral monists such as James (1912), Mach (1889/1984), and 
Perry (1912) deny the distinction between psychological acts and their objects 
(TK, 33). Even still, he insists that there is a need to explain why introspective 
awareness at least appears to be relational. Moreover, he believes that neutral 
monism faces daunting challenges which cast it in serious doubt (Pincock, this 
book). Among them is the fact that “it is obliged to have recourse to extraneous 
considerations, such as the nervous system, in order to explain the difference 
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between what I experience and what I do not experience, and this difference is 
too immediate for any explanation that neutral monism can give” (TK, 31).
One thing to notice about Russell’s view is that subjects do not invariably have 
introspective awareness of their psychological episodes. Rather, introspective 
awareness is something subjects “can” and “often” enjoy with respect to their 
thoughts, feelings, desires, and so on, through an act of “what may be called 
inner sense” (POP, 80).14 On such occasions, subjects are not only conscious 
of mind-independent objects, but also achieve a state of “self-consciousness” 
through which they are directly aware of the psychological episodes themselves 
(POP, 77–81). But, Russell suggests, such self-consciousness is seemingly absent 
in cases in which subjects do not attend to the objects of their experience (TK, 
121). Furthermore, he argues that “it is logically evident that there must be 
instances [of being aware of something without being aware of such awareness], 
since otherwise every acquaintance would entail an infinite introspective series, 
which is absurd” (TK, 121).
The issue of determining when exactly subjects enjoy self-consciousness is 
complicated, however, by the fact that Russell also thinks subjects can be directly 
aware of their psychological episodes without directing introspective attention 
to them. For instance, he says that subjects can have introspective awareness 
of faint and peripheral sensations, dim thoughts and desires, and various other 
conscious episodes at the margins of their attentive focus (TK, 8–9). In fact, he 
argues, the field of introspective acquaintance must extend beyond the limited 
range of introspective attention since such acts involve the selection of objects 
from a larger, already present field of awareness “out of which attention chooses 
what it wants” (TK, 9).
In addition to being acquainted with particular psychological episodes, 
subjects can be introspectively aware of their qualities and various relations 
that hold between them. For instance, subjects can be introspectively aware 
of relations of similarity and difference between particular psychological acts. 
This allows subjects to become directly aware, through acts of conceiving, of 
the psychological kinds they fall under and various relational universals they 
instantiate.15 With the help of memory, subjects can also be directly aware of 
the temporal relations of the psychological episodes to themselves (in their 
private space of time) as well as their duration, simultaneity, and succession 
(TK, 64–78). Perhaps most importantly, subjects can be introspectively aware 
of the relation of “being experienced together” which holds between the various 
sensory, cognitive, and conative episodes that make up their psychological life 
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(TK, 8). For Russell, the awareness of such “being experience together” relations 
explains the unity that subjects experience their minds as having at any one 
time. By extension, the experience of psychological unity across time is achieved 
by combining their present experience of psychological unity with memories of 
similarly unified thoughts and experiences at earlier times (TK, 12–13).
It must be emphasized, however, that the direct introspective awareness 
subjects enjoy with respect to (at least some of) their psychological episodes 
and their features does not constitute knowledge of any truths about them. Nor 
does such introspective acquaintance, all by itself, entail any knowledge of truths 
about them. Rather, introspective acquaintance presents psychological episodes 
to the subjects who have them and thereby put those subjects in a position to 
think, talk, and acquire knowledge about them by exercising relevant cognitive 
capacities.
4 Inner perception and introspective judgments
Russell does not (at least to my knowledge) make explicit how exactly subjects 
acquire knowledge of truths about their psychological episodes on the basis 
of being introspectively acquainted with them. However, he asserts in KAKD 
that “from the point of view of theory of knowledge, introspective knowledge is 
exactly on a level with knowledge derived from sight or hearing” (111). Given 
similar remarks Russell makes elsewhere, it is reasonable to reconstruct his view 
based on what he says concerning how subjects derive knowledge of truths from 
other forms of acquaintance, such as sensation, memory, and conceiving.
When it comes to sensory knowledge, Russell draws a distinction between 
having direct awareness of objects through sensation, having direct awareness 
of complexes involving those objects and their features, and making judgments 
about the complexes of which subjects are directly aware.16 Regarding the latter 
two categories of sensory knowledge, Russell distinguishes between “truths of 
perception” and the “judgements of perception” which aim to express them 
(POP, 177–78).17 Both are kinds of “intuitive knowledge” which are non-
inferentially derived from sensory experience, but there are fundamental 
differences between them.
The perception of truths is a matter of subjects being directly presented in 
experience with facts concerning the existence of sense-data, the features 
they possess, and their relations to other sense-data (POP, 178). As such, the 
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perception of truths should properly be considered a species of knowledge of 
things—in this case of sensory complexes—by acquaintance. Indeed, Russell 
remarks, “we may distinguish sensation from perception by saying that the 
former gives particulars while the latter gives facts” (TK, 37). He also makes this 
point clear in POP:
Thus in regard to any complex fact, there are, theoretically, two ways in which 
it may be known: (1) by means of a judgment, in which its several parts are 
judged to be related as they are in fact related; (2) by means of acquaintance 
with the complex fact itself, which may (in a large sense) be called perception, 
though it is by no means confined to objects of the senses. (211, second emphasis 
added)18
In POP, he tentatively assumes that all such perception of truths is what he 
later calls “complex perception” (TK, 125). In complex perception, subjects are 
directly aware of both the complexes presented to them in perception and (at 
least some of) the constituents of those complexes. This contrasts with what 
he calls “simple perception” in which subjects are presented with complexes as 
wholes without being directly aware of any of their constituents.
When it comes to judgments of perception, more is required of subjects 
than the receptive presentation of sensory complexes. Subjects must attend 
selectively to these complexes, in some cases analyze them, and ultimately form 
non-inferential judgments which aim to correspond to them. On Russell’s view, 
analyzing complexes requires selectively attending to both their constituents 
and the relations between them (TK, 123). Such analysis is a precondition 
for subjects being able to judge, explicitly or implicitly, that sense-data have 
particular sensible qualities (such as “this is round” or “this is red”) or stand in 
particular sensible relations to each other (such as “this is to the right of that”) 
(POP, 179). In contrast, Russell suggests that judgments about the existence of 
experienced sense-data (such as “there is that”) do not require analysis (POP, 
179).19 Thus, subjects can make existential judgments about them without at 
the same time making any judgment about what kind of thing they are, what 
qualities they have, or what relations they bear to other things (even if subjects 
nearly always do so).
Altogether, this account of sensory knowledge provides a well-developed 
model for how, at this time, Russell likely conceived of introspective knowledge. 
Such an account would draw a distinction between having direct awareness 
of psychological acts, having direct awareness of psychological complexes, 
and making judgments about them. Both of the latter kinds of knowledge 
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would be cases of intuitive knowledge that are non-inferentially derived from 
introspective experience. The first of these, which we might call “truths of inner 
perception,” would involve the receptive presentation of mental complexes 
to the subject through “inner perception.”20 As such, it is best thought of as 
introspective knowledge of mental complexes by acquaintance, rather than as 
a kind of knowledge of truths about them. If such inner perception directly 
presents them to subjects as wholes (without at the same time presenting their 
constituents), the result will be “simple inner perception.” On the other hand, 
if it also presents at least some of the complex’s constituents, the result will be 
“complex inner perception.” Russell initially supposes that subjects have complex 
inner perceptions of their psychological episodes, but gradually comes to think 
that subjects only have simple inner perceptions due to growing worries about 
whether subjects enjoy introspective self-acquaintance.
As in the case of sensory knowledge, arriving at “judgments of inner 
perception” would involve the active exercise of various cognitive capacities. 
Subjects would have to attend selectively to the perceived mental complexes, in 
some cases analyze them in terms of their constituents, and issue non-inferential 
judgments which aim to correspond to them.21 The logically simplest of such 
judgments would concern the existence of these mental complexes and would 
take the form of an introspectively directed “there is this” (or perhaps even 
“lo!”). Such judgments would not, by themselves, logically entail more complex 
ones about what kinds of objects are being experienced, what features they have, 
or what relations they bear to other things. Subjects could only make judgments 
of this kind after selectively attending to (at least some of) the constituents of the 
mental complexes and analyzing them in terms of their features and relations to 
each other.
Before moving on, it is worth noting that Russell’s account of introspective 
knowledge thus far does not exhaust the knowledge subjects can have regarding 
their psychological lives. For subjects can also acquire indirect knowledge 
of their psychological episodes by description, as well as derive additional 
knowledge of truths about them through the application of self-evident 
logical principles. The former of these is particularly vital for knowing of, and 
thereby being in a position to know about, unremembered past thoughts and 
experiences, predicted or imagined thoughts and experiences, and unconscious 
psychological episodes, among other things.22 What is more, the capacity for 
subjects to know of mental complexes and their constituents by description 
comes to play a key role in Russell’s developing views about self-knowledge 
during this period.
Bloomsbury Companion to Bertrand Russell.indb   265 03-05-2018   17:44:31
266 The Bloomsbury Companion to Bertrand Russell
5 Is there acquaintance with the self?
On Russell’s early views (1911 to 1913), there are a number of different ways 
that subjects can think and talk about (and thereby be in a position to acquire 
knowledge about) themselves. First, subjects can think (or talk) about themselves 
by means of a description that they uniquely satisfy. For example, the right 
subjects can think (or talk) about “the philosopher who received the Nobel Prize 
in Literature in 1950,” “the future president of the United States in 2030,” “the 
featherless biped who wrote this chapter,” and so on, and manage to think about 
themselves because of things they have done or features they uniquely possess at 
some time. When subjects have this kind of knowledge of themselves, they have 
what Russell calls “merely descriptive knowledge” of the persons they happen to 
be (KAKD, 113).
Second, subjects can think (or talk) about themselves using ordinary proper 
names that, as matters of linguistic convention, designate them. During this 
period, Russell treats such ordinary names as expressing, in a particular context, 
truncated definite descriptions that uniquely pick out their bearers. Sometimes 
these descriptions will be analogous to those mentioned above and include 
(somewhat vague and varying) unique historical or personal information about 
the persons they designate. However, in the most basic case ordinary names 
can designate subjects by means of descriptions of the form “the person named 
such-and-such” (KAKD, 119). In this way, Russell can think about himself 
as “the person called Bertie,” Bernie Sanders can think about himself as “the 
person called Bernie,” and so on. Because ordinary names express (contextually 
determined) truncated definite descriptions, subjects who have knowledge of 
themselves by means of ordinary names once again have merely descriptive 
knowledge of the persons they happen to be.
On Russell’s view, neither of these kinds of knowledge captures the most 
basic, intimate knowledge that subjects have concerning themselves—
knowledge which is best expressed in ordinary language with the context-
sensitive expression “I.” For one thing, anyone with the appropriate 
descriptive knowledge of someone is on equal footing in thinking of them 
using descriptions such as these. In doing so, subjects are thinking of someone 
(who they happen to be) in a way that is characteristically used for thinking of 
persons other than themselves (and is, in fact, the only way of doing so). For 
another, subjects seem to have ways of thinking of themselves as themselves 
that are more basic than, and do not require, descriptive knowledge of this 
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kind. For example, John Perry can have knowledge of himself as himself even 
if he does not realize that he is, in fact, “the person leaving a trail of sugar in 
the grocery store,” or wrongly thinks he is “the brooding vigilante superhero 
of Gotham City.” Likewise, he can think of himself as himself even if he 
forgets that the description “the person named John Perry” designates him, 
or acquires the delusional belief that the description “the person named Bruce 
Wayne” does.23
In KAKD, Russell defends the view that the most basic form of self-knowledge 
subjects possess is introspective knowledge of themselves by acquaintance. 
In particular, he maintains that subjects can be directly aware of themselves 
through acts of complex inner perception directed at their own psychological 
episodes. He does hesitate, however, when it comes to the question of whether 
subjects can have introspective acquaintance with themselves as bare particulars, 
independent of such psychological episodes. Indeed, he says, “it is hard to 
discover any state of mind in which I am aware of myself alone, as opposed to 
a complex of which I am a constituent” (KAKD, 110). But, he insists, it is “very 
difficult to account for plain facts if we assume that we do not have acquaintance 
with ourselves” (KAKD, 110).24
The chief difficulty arises when trying to account for how subjects can 
understand their own introspective judgments. Recall that at this time, Russell 
is committed to Russell’s Principle, according to which “whenever a relation of 
supposing or judging occurs, the terms to which the supposing or judging mind is 
related by the relation of supposing or judging must be terms with which the mind 
in question is acquainted” (KAKD, 118). So given that psychological episodes 
are complexes involving a subject, a psychological act, and an object, subjects 
can understand their introspective judgments only if they are acquainted with 
themselves or with all of the elements of an introspective-based description 
of themselves (KAKD, 110). However, he argues that there is a formidable 
problem with supposing that, upon analysis, the introspective judgments 
subjects make involve only self-descriptions, rather than self-acquaintance. 
The problem is this:
If we wished to maintain the view that there is no acquaintance with Self, we 
might argue as follows: We are acquainted with acquaintance, and we know that 
it is a relation.  .  . . Hence we know that this complex must have a constituent 
which is that which is acquainted, i.e. must have a subject-term as well as an 
object-term. This subject we define as “I.” Thus “I” means “the subject-term in 
awareness of which I am aware.” (KAKD, 110)
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Russell’s worry here is that if subjects only know themselves by description 
roughly as “the subject-term of the psychological episode with which I am 
introspectively acquainted,” they will in turn need to understand the meaning 
of the “I,” properly analyzed, as it occurs in this description. But if the subject 
designated by that descriptive element is known only by an analogous 
description, and so on, then understanding an introspective judgment would 
involve an infinite regress. The best way to block that regress, Russell reasons, 
is if at some level of analysis the descriptive elements eventually bottom out in 
introspective self-acquaintance (KAKD, 110).25
By the time of POP, however, Russell becomes less confident that subjects 
do, in fact, enjoy introspective self-acquaintance. His growing hesitation stems 
largely from Humean worries about whether subjects ever directly experience 
themselves in introspection. Indeed, he remarks, “when we try to look into 
ourselves we always seem to come upon some particular thought or feeling, 
and not upon the ‘I’ which has the thought or feeling” (POP, 78). Thus, when 
it comes to acquaintance-based introspective knowledge, “it is our particular 
thoughts and feelings that have primitive certainty,” rather than knowledge of 
the self (POP, 30).
Nevertheless, Russell asserts, “there are some reasons for thinking that we 
are acquainted with the ‘I’, though the acquaintance is hard to disentangle from 
other things” (POP, 78). To begin with, he suggests that it simply seems evident, 
upon careful reflection, that subjects can be acquainted with themselves in inner 
perception given the relational character of psychological acts (POP, 79). What 
is more, there is no serious question of who the subject of the psychological 
episode is:
When a case of acquaintance is one with which I can be acquainted (as I am 
acquainted with my acquaintance with the sense-datum representing the sun), it 
is plain that the person acquainted is myself. Thus, when I am acquainted with my 
seeing the sun, the whole fact with which I am acquainted is “Self-acquainted-
with-sense-datum.” (POP, 79, emphasis added)
What Russell seems to be suggesting here is that the high degree of certainty 
subjects have that they, rather than anyone else, are the subject of the introspected 
psychological acts is difficult (if not impossible) to explain on the assumption 
that their self-knowledge is merely descriptive.
Russell also gestures at something like the regress argument he offers 
previously in KAKD, though with somewhat less confidence in its persuasiveness. 
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Indeed, he argues, “we know the truth ‘I am acquainted with this sense-datum’. 
[But it] is hard to see how we could know this truth, or even understand what 
is meant by it, unless we were acquainted with something which we call ‘I’” 
(POP, 79–80). Once again, the worry concerns how Russell’s Principle can be 
satisfied if subjects lack introspective self-acquaintance (POP, 58). However, he 
grants, “the question [of whether subjects can be acquainted with themselves] 
is difficult, and complicated arguments can be adduced on either side. Hence, 
although acquaintance with ourselves seems probably to occur, it is not wise to 
assert that it undoubtedly does occur” (POP, 79–80).
Despite his continuing belief in the likelihood of self-acquaintance, he 
becomes increasingly less sure that these selves are long-lived, persisting things 
such as persons. Answering the regress argument, he notes, does not require 
“that we are acquainted with a more or less permanent person, the same 
to-day as yesterday, but it does seem as though we must be acquainted with 
that thing, whatever its nature, which sees the sun and has acquaintance with 
sense-data” (POP, 80). Similarly, he denies that acquaintance with a persisting 
self, rather than a momentary one, is essential for explaining the high degree of 
confidence subjects have that they, rather than anyone else, are the subjects of 
their introspective judgments (POP, 29–30).
In fact, he argues that the lack of introspective evidence for the existence 
of a persisting self blunts some of the force of Descartes’ well-known cogito 
argument:
“I think, therefore I am” says rather more than is strictly certain. It might seem as 
though we were quite sure of being the same person to-day as we were yesterday, 
and this is no doubt true in some sense. But the real Self is as hard to arrive at as 
the real table, and does not seem to have that absolute, convincing certainty that 
belongs to particular experiences. (POP, 29)26
So while Russell continues to think that subjects likely have self-acquaintance 
in POP, he is inclined to think that persons know of themselves as persisting 
things only by description—roughly as those things (whatever their nature may 
be) that have the continuing psychological lives they, as momentary subjects, are 
aware of through introspection and memory.
By the time of TK, however, “the elusiveness of the subject in introspection” 
convinces Russell that subjects likely lack introspective awareness of both 
the persisting and momentary self (36). Instead, subjects only know of them-
selves as themselves by description roughly as “the subject of such-and-such 
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introspected psychological episodes” (TK, 35). Put somewhat differently, 
he says:
Our theory maintains that the datum when we are [introspectively] aware of 
experiencing an object O is the fact “something is acquainted with O.” The 
subject appears here, not in its individual capacity, but as an “apparent variable”; 
thus such a fact may be a datum in spite of incapacity for acquaintance with the 
subject. (TK, 37)
Of course, given the relational character of all acquaintance, the act of self-
consciousness itself will involve both a subject and the psychological episode 
experienced. Thus, Russell remarks, an act of self-consciousness can be 
represented symbolically as “S′—A—[(∃S) • (S—A—O)],” where S is the subject 
of the introspected episode, O is the object of that episode, A is acquaintance, 
and S′ the subject introspecting the episode (TK, 38).27
There are a number of issues raised by Russell’s newly adopted denial of self-
acquaintance. One might worry that while the subject S of the introspected 
psychological episode is known only by description, the subject S′ doing the 
introspecting does not appear in this way in the represented complex. Thus, it 
might strike one that self-acquaintance is required after all for subjects to make 
introspective judgments about their psychological episodes. However, Russell 
is quick to reiterate his claim in POP that episodes involving acquaintance 
need not themselves be known by acquaintance, on pain of an infinite regress 
(TK, 39).
Russell must also answer his former objection that introspective self-
knowledge in the absence of self-acquaintance would require the use of the 
regress-producing self-description “the subject of the psychological episode 
I am aware of having.” He addresses this challenge partly by reconceiving the 
relationship between the meaning of “I” and the subject’s present psychological 
episodes. Indeed, he argues, “we might suppose that ‘my present experience’ 
might be defined as all the experience which ‘I’ have ‘now’. But in fact we shall 
find that ‘I’ and ‘now’, in the order of knowledge, must be defined in terms of ‘my 
present experience’, rather than vice versa” (TK, 8). As Russell now sees things, 
the meaning of “I” derives from the subject’s ability to be directly aware of his 
or her psychological episodes as wholes (via simple inner perception) and to 
designate them with proper names (TK, 39). Thus, the meaning of “I” as used by 
a subject in an introspective judgment is roughly “the subject of this presented 
psychological episode (and others co-experienced with it)” where the meaning 
of the “this” is simply given to the subject without any need for him or her to 
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understand that it is so given (TK, 40). In this way, the alleged regress involved 
in introspective self-description is blocked.28
Russell’s view that subjects lack self-acquaintance, despite having introspective 
acquaintance with their ongoing conscious mental lives, has far-reaching 
consequences for his views about what subjects can know about themselves. For 
one thing, he reasons:
If it is true, as it seems to be, that subjects are not given in acquaintance, it 
follows that nothing can be known as to their intrinsic nature. We cannot know, 
for example, that they differ from matter, nor yet that they do not differ. They 
are known merely as referents for the relation of acquaintance, and for those 
other psychical relations—judging, desiring, etc.—which imply acquaintance. 
(TK, 37)
What is more, he continues to hold that introspection cannot reveal whether 
the successive psychological episodes of a single mind share a single persisting 
subject or different momentary ones (TK, 35). In fact, he argues that there is no 
good reason to think that the subject of an act of self-consciousness is identical 
with the subject of the psychological episode being introspected, even when 
they are contemporaneous (TK, 38). Indeed, he continues, “the one ‘self ’ or 
‘mind’ which embraces both may be a construction, and need not, so far as the 
logical necessities of our problem are concerned, involve any identity of the two 
subjects” (TK, 38–9). This suggestion, that selves and minds might be logical 
constructions, soon becomes central to Russell’s thought on these topics.
6 Constructing the self
Shortly after completing POP, Russell begins to explore how the techniques 
of logical construction, which were central to the logicist project of Principia 
Mathematica, might also be fruitfully applied to physics and the empirical 
sciences, more broadly.29 Russell’s change in course undeniably results from his 
growing unease about inferring material objects from sense-data, but there is 
much debate about what exactly is behind his preference for logical constructions 
over inferred entities. Some think that he sees logical constructions as providing 
a better tool for answering traditional skepticism (Sainsbury 1979; Graham 
forthcoming). Others interpret him as adopting logical constructions to explain 
how knowledge of physics is possible while better respecting the principle of 
acquaintance (Pears 1987; Hylton 1990; Baldwin 2001). Still others take his 
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theory of logical constructions to be a linguistic doctrine according to which 
the meaning of all talk ostensibly about physical objects is really about sense-
data and nothing more (Soames 2003 and 2014). However, as Wahl has cogently 
pointed out, none of these interpretations is plausible given Russell’s appeal to 
both unsensed sensibilia and the sense-data of others in the logical construction 
of matter (2015, 98–100).
A more compelling interpretation is that Russell prefers the ontological 
parsimony of a physics logically constructed from sense-data and unobserved 
entities of the same kind to one requiring inferred entities of a fundamentally 
different, and unobservable, kind (Bostock 2012; Wahl 2015). The advantage of 
logical constructions, then, is that they supply a means for paring down the kinds 
of entities to which physics is ontologically committed. This reading also receives 
support from his frequent designation of the objects of logical construction as 
“logical fictions,” suggesting a penchant on his part to deny their existence.30 To 
take one notable example from his 1918 Philosophy of Logical Atomism (hereafter 
PLA), Russell asserts that statements ostensibly about Piccadilly, when properly 
analyzed, will not express propositions including it as a constituent, but will 
instead include the series of suitably related sense-data and unsensed sensibilia 
which are normally presumed to be appearances caused by a certain region of 
the Earth’s surface (51). But, he remarks, “I believe that series and classes are of 
the nature of logical fictions: therefore that thesis, if it can be maintained, will 
dissolve Piccadilly into a fiction” (PLA, 51).
If the elimination of unnecessary kinds of inferred entities is indeed the 
primary motivation behind Russell’s logical constructions, it would have radical 
consequences for his views about knowledge of the “self ” and “mind.” As noted 
above, he suggests, but does not endorse, the possibility of logically constructing 
both in TK. But by the time of his 1915 “The Ultimate Constituents of Matter” 
(hereafter UCM), he embraces this view. In this paper, Russell relays his first 
cinematic experience of seeing what appears to be a persisting man but which, 
in reality, is “a [continuous] succession of films, each with a different momentary 
man” (UCM, 129). Praising the cinema in this respect as “a better metaphysician 
than common sense, physics, or philosophy,” Russell asserts that “the real man 
too . . . is really a series of momentary men, each different one from the other, 
and bound together, not by numerical identity, but by continuity and certain 
intrinsic causal laws” (UCM, 129). Thus, persons, like other ordinary objects, 
can be treated as series of suitably arranged momentary particulars “collected 
together on account of some property which makes it convenient to be able to 
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speak of them as wholes, [and] are what I call logical constructions or symbolic 
fictions” (UCM, 129). These remarks, and similar ones made elsewhere, lead some 
to read Russell as flatly denying the existence of the self (whether momentary or 
persisting), and ipso facto any possibility of genuine self-knowledge (Sainsbury 
1979; Olson 2007).
One problem for reading Russell as eliminating the self, as Sainsbury (1979) 
points out, is that it conflicts with his ongoing commitment to the relational 
nature of psychological acts and mental facts (192). Thus, either Russell does not 
recognize this tension in his views about the self and mind, or his description 
of them as logical constructions is not motivated primarily by considerations of 
ontological parsimony. While Sainsbury sees the former as more likely, there is 
good reason to prefer the latter interpretation.
As I read him, Russell’s logical constructions are largely guided by 
epistemological concerns other than a desire to secure certain knowledge in the 
face of skepticism. Rather, the aim of logical construction is to reinterpret a body 
of knowledge ostensibly about unobservable kinds of entities entirely in terms 
of a smaller number of observable kinds of entities (Hylton 2015). For Russell, 
there are several important benefits of doing so. First, to the extent that a body 
of knowledge can be reinterpreted in terms of observable kinds of entities (even 
if they are not, in fact, observed by anyone), it becomes possible, in principle, for 
the truth of that body of knowledge (so interpreted) to be verifiable.31 Second, it 
also explains how the body of knowledge (so interpreted) can be knowable, in 
principle, to subjects, even if it does not describe its actual psychological origin.32 
Third, it reduces the size of the apparatus needed to account for this knowledge, 
thereby diminishing (but not eliminating) its risk of error (PLA, 154). At the 
same time, it reduces the extent to which the truth of the body of knowledge is 
held hostage to the existence of unobservable kinds of entities.33 Thus, it makes 
it possible to accept the body of knowledge (so interpreted) while sidestepping 
contentious metaphysical debates about the nature of unobservable kinds of 
entities and the legitimacy of the principles used to infer their existence.34 In 
doing so, it renders possible the elimination of the logically constructed entities, 
but does not, all by itself, give grounds for doing so.35
When it comes to the logical construction of the mind and self, then, Russell’s 
primary aim is not to deny (nor affirm) the existence of the metaphysical subject 
or ego. Rather, it is to reinterpret the body of knowledge subjects have concerning 
themselves and other people into a smaller apparatus that is less risky, more 
apt for empirical verification, and less prone to entanglement in contentious 
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metaphysical disputes. On Russell’s view, empirical knowledge of other persons 
can be logically constructed from series of suitably related sensory appearances 
they present, rather than in terms of a persisting ego since “whether there be 
such a persistent subject or not, [that] is certainly not a datum” (PLA, 149). In a 
similar manner, subjects’ empirical knowledge of their own minds can be logically 
constructed from series of suitably related thoughts, memories, sensations, and 
other psychological episodes presented introspectively without any need to 
assume a metaphysical self (or selves) to whom they are presented (PLA, 149).36 
Lastly, when it comes to these subjects’ “selves,” such knowledge can be logically 
constructed from series of suitably related psychological episodes and sensory 
appearances together (PLA, 149–50). In a subject’s own case, then, “you have a 
much richer material and are therefore much less likely to be mistaken as to your 
own identity than as to someone else’s” (PLA, 149). So while Russell notes that 
“there are [sometimes] mistakes even as to one’s own identity, in cases of multiple 
personality and so forth,” he also asserts that “as a rule you will know … that it is 
you, not by consciousness of the ego at all but by all sorts of things, by memory, by 
the way you feel and the way you look and a host of things” (PLA, 149).
But despite the fact that the self and mind can be treated as logical constructions 
for most empirical purposes, Russell insists that “we shall not deny that there 
may be a metaphysical ego” (PLA, 150).37 In fact, there is reason to think that 
he continues to accept, however cautiously, the existence of the metaphysical 
ego (whether momentary or persisting) as an inferred entity. Russell’s primary 
grounds for doing so are the difficulties, noted in sections two and three above, 
in accounting for the difference between what someone experiences and does 
not experience, the selectiveness of attention, and egocentric and demonstrative 
thought, among other things (PLA, 86–87 and 153). However, he eventually 
confesses to the possibility that these worries might “be solved by ingenuity” and 
that these issues are “so delicate and so subtle that I cannot feel quite sure whether 
[this set of objections] is a valid one or not” (153). Thus, while Russell is arguably 
not completely agnostic about the existence of the metaphysical self or ego by the 
time of PLA, as Pears (1967) seems to suggest, he is (at least) very nearly so.
6 Toward neutral monism
Taking stock, Russell’s theory of introspection from roughly 1911 to 1918 is 
grounded in the threefold distinction between direct awareness of psychological 
objects, the presentation of psychological complexes, and introspective 
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judgments about these complexes. When it comes to self-knowledge, his 
initial view is that subjects enjoy self-acquaintance, but he gradually comes to 
think subjects merely know themselves by introspective self-description, and 
he ultimately arrives at the view that “selves” and “minds” are, in fact, logical 
constructions. There is good reason to think that these changes are not driven by 
a Cartesian quest for certainty and that his preference for logically constructing 
the self and mind over inferring them is not primarily motivated by a taste for 
ontological parsimony. Indeed, Russell seemingly continues to cautiously accept 
the existence of the metaphysical self in 1918 due to the difficulties in explaining 
the selectiveness of the mind and egocentric thought, and because the relational 
character of psychological acts is introspectively observable even if the self is 
not.
Russell’s views about introspection and self-knowledge begin to undergo 
significant changes in his 1919 “On Propositions” (hereafter OP) and 1921 The 
Analysis of Mind (hereafter AMi). In OP, Russell at last comes to the view that 
neither mental subjects nor psychological acts are discoverable in introspection 
(25). At the same time, he grows increasingly confident that neutral monism can 
account for both the selectivity of attention and egocentric and demonstrative 
thought (Landini 2011; Pincock, this book). As a result, he concludes that there 
are neither empirical nor theoretical grounds for drawing a distinction between 
subjects, psychological acts, and their objects. Instead, he embraces the view that 
both “minds” and “matter” are constructions composed of transitory elements 
that are intrinsically neither mental nor physical but are rendered one or both 
depending on whether they are parts of physical and/or psychological processes. 
Consequently, he comes to believe that “persons” and “selves” are also bundles of 
transitory neutral elements bound together by the right kinds of spatiotemporal 
and causal relations.38
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to survey the many changes that result 
from Russell’s adoption of neutral monism. However, it is worthwhile to mention, 
all too briefly, some of the more significant ones regarding introspection and self-
knowledge. Whereas he previously conceived of sensory experience, for instance, 
as a matter of subjects engaging in an act of sensation directed toward mind-
independent sense-data, he comes to see it as the occurrence of qualitied sensory 
events (or “percepts”) in the brain that are causally connected to physical events 
outside the brain. As a result, he comes to deny that there is a sharp distinction 
between awareness of sensory experience and the perception of the external 
world, the key difference only being the degree of privacy involved and their 
position in the causal process (AMi, 118–21). As for introspective judgments, 
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Russell adopts the view that they are a matter of belief-image events in the brain 
being causally connected to (and often in some way resembling) sensory events 
elsewhere in the brain (AMi, 116–22).39 In this respect, introspective judgments 
are not essentially different in kind from other sorts of judgments and are “not, in 
isolation, in any degree more trustworthy than ‘external’ perception” (AMi, 123). 
Thus, not only does Russell’s neutral monism aim at closing the gap between 
“mind” and “matter,” it also aims at doing so regarding introspective knowledge 
and knowledge of the world more generally. Much more can be said about each 
of these issues, but that must be a project for another time (though see Pincock, 
this book).
Notes
1 In TK, Russell acknowledges that “a certain difficulty as regards the use of words 
is unavoidable. . . . The meanings of common words are vague, fluctuating and 
ambiguous, like the shadow thrown by a flickering streetlamp on a windy night; 
yet in the nucleus of this uncertain patch of meaning, we may find some precise 
concept for which philosophy requires a name. . . . Sometimes it will be well to 
introduce a new technical term, sometimes it will be better to polish the common 
word until it becomes suitable for technical purposes” (6).
2 In saying that knowledge of something puts one in a position to think and talk 
about it, I do not mean to imply that all other preconditions for thought and talk 
about it are met. A subject might also need to attend to it, demonstrate it with a 
proper name, analyze it, or otherwise exercise relevant cognitive capacities. The key 
(trivial) point is that a subject cannot in any way cognize something of which he or 
she has no knowledge whatsoever.
3 Proops (2014) suggests that Russell’s key divergence from how James 
(1890/1950) understands the distinction between knowledge of things and 
knowledge of truths is that he allows, whereas James does not, that subjects 
can have genuine knowledge of, and therefore be in a position to know about, 
objects outside of their acquaintance. While James grants that subjects can in 
some sense conceive of things beyond their experience, he insists that such 
conceptions are “hollow and inadequate” and generate a “false conceit of 
knowledge” (1890/1950, II, 7).
4 Interestingly, later in TK Russell seems to leave open the possibility of both 
acquaintance and mental subjects being further analyzable, saying only that he has 
“no analysis to suggest, and therefore formally both will appear as if they were 
simple, though nothing will be falsified if they are found to be not simple” (45).
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5 James remarks that it is a shortcoming of the English language that it does not 
explicitly draw “the generic distinction between the-thing-thought-of and the-
thought-thinking-it, which in German is expressed by the opposition between 
Gedachtes and Gedanke, in Latin by that between cogitatum and cogitation” 
(1890/1950, I, 195). This shortcoming, of course, is in addition to the failure of 
English to mark the difference between knowledge of things and knowledge about 
things. For an excellent discussion of Russell’s introduction to Brentano through his 
teacher G. F. Stout, see Nasim 2008.
6 Russell is clear in POP that sense-data are external to the mind but is frustratingly 
silent about their nature. Early in this work, he says that sense-data are at most 
“signs of some property [inherent in a physical object] which perhaps causes all the 
sensations, but is not actually apparent in any of them” (16). He goes on to suggest 
that they likely correspond in some way to the relational structure of physical 
objects in physical space, but are seemingly themselves neither mental nor physical 
(49–50). However, it could be that Russell already implicitly sees sense-data as 
transitory physical particulars that are signs of the unobserved material continuants 
of physics, as Landini 2011 claims (238–39).
7 See Carey 2015 for an in-depth discussion of Russell’s changing thought about 
acquaintance via memory, hallucination, dreams, and imagination and how they 
influence his views about physical knowledge.
8 This is by no means an exhaustive list of the ways subjects can be acquainted with 
external sensory and abstract objects. Subjects can also fear them, desire them, love 
them, and hate them, among many other possibilities. See Klement 2015 for an 
excellent discussion of Russell’s views about logical objects.
9 Also see Amijee 2013, Linsky 2015, Proops 2015, and Wishon 2017.
10 As Amijee and others have noted, Russell also expresses this claim in a 1911 letter to 
Gilbert Murray, the Home University Library editor for POP: “Acquaintance with a 
thing does not (theoretically) involve any knowledge of truths about the thing, and 
in practice involves often very little such knowledge” (Amijee 2013, 1183).
11 Among the many interpreters who read Russell this way are Baldwin 2001, Bostock 
2012, Campbell 2009, Evans 1983, Geach 1957, Jeshion 2010, Ludlow 2013, Irvine 
2015, and Soames 2010.
12 See Wishon 2015 and 2017. Also see Landini 2011, Linsky 2015, Proops 2015, 
and Wahl 2015. To my knowledge, Russell’s earliest statement that subjects cannot 
achieve absolute certainty even with perceptual judgments about what is currently 
given in sensory experience occurs in his 1910 Philosophical Essays (hereafter PE) 
(182–83).
13 Russell goes on to suggest that introspective awareness of psychological episodes 
is perhaps what distinguishes conscious human persons from sentient nonhuman 
animals (POP, 77–78).
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14 One should resist the temptation to understand “inner sense,” as Russell is here 
loosely using the phrase, as either a literal act of looking into the theater of the 
mind (since psychological episodes are relations between subjects and things 
outside the mind) or in terms of causally mediated internal scanning or tracking 
mechanisms. This passage also shows that Russell rejects the view that whenever 
subjects bear an acquaintance relation to anything, they are at the same time 
acquainted with their acquaintance. This view is defended by Brentano (1874/2009), 
Meinong (1910), and many in the phenomenological tradition (most notably 
Husserl 1913/1982 and Sartre 1943/1948).
15 See KAKD, 111; POP, 158–61; and TK, 79–89. We must be careful to note 
that Russell does not think that knowledge of universals can be acquired from 
acquaintance with particular instances of psychological relations and their 
particular similarities and differences alone. As his regress argument against 
nominalism demonstrates, he thinks subjects must also be directly acquainted 
with the bare universal relation of resemblance at the very least (POP, 149–51). 
In TK, Russell suggests that we are likely directly aware of other bare universal 
relations as well (79–85). For more on Russell’s regress argument for universals, 
see Perovic 2015.
16 Russell leaves open whether the correspondence of complexes with facts or truths 
is a matter of identity or of some other one-one relation (TK, 79–80). I here follow 
Russell in treating them as identical for ease of exposition.
17 To my knowledge, Russell first draws this distinction in his 1910 “On the Nature 
of Truth and Falsehood” in PE, but he does not therein discuss its applicability to 
introspective knowledge (181–83).
18 Similarly, Russell claims that subjects can have “perceptions” of past complexes 
presented in memory as well as of abstract complexes presented in a kind of 
intellectual experience, among other possibilities.
19 Russell is here following James who also suggests that the most basic judgments 
of perception have roughly the form of “there is this.” However, James argues that 
even perceptual judgments of this kind “would perhaps be too discriminative, and 
the intellectual acknowledgement [of the existence of the objects of sensation] 
would [in its most basic form] be better expressed by the bare interjection ‘lo!’” 
(1890/1950, II, 8).
20 Once again, we must be careful not to understand “inner perception” here as 
a literal act of perception directed inwards (given the relational character of 
psychological episodes) or in terms of causally mediated internal scanning or 
tracking mechanisms.
21 As with all judgments, Russell allows that these introspective judgments can fail 
to correspond to the mental complexes they are about, and so they do not enjoy 
absolute certainty. It is worth noting how Russell’s views about introspective 
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knowledge here differ from Brentano’s (as I read him). First, as noted above, 
Brentano thinks that every psychological act involves, in itself, both awareness 
of something and awareness of the act itself (1874/2009, 107). Second, he does 
not distinguish between inner perception and introspective judgments since, 
on his view, the former are already cognitions (111). Third, he argues that every 
act of awareness is accompanied by an inner perception of it (in addition to the 
reflexive awareness involved in that very act) (111). And fourth, he holds that it 
is immediately evident that inner perceptions are infallible and absolutely certain 
(107–11).
22 Russell’s views at this time concerning the full scope and nature of unconscious 
psychological episodes, if there are any, are somewhat unclear. But he does 
suggest that subjects, like chickens and horses, engage in unconscious reasoning 
(POP, 97–98 and 175). By the time of his 1915 “The Ultimate Constituents of 
Matter,” Russell is more explicit about the existence of unconscious psychological 
phenomena: “Psychologists point out how much of what we think we see 
is supplied by association or unconscious inference, how much is mental 
interpretation, and how doubtful is the residuum which can be regarded as crude 
datum” (126–27).
23 See Perry 1979, 2009, and 2012.
24 Russell amends this passage in the revised version of KAKD that appears in his 
1919 Mysticism and Logic and Other Essays to say, “It is difficult, but probably not 
impossible, to account for plain facts if we assume that we do not have acquaintance 
with ourselves” (Papers 6, 149).
25 As Pincock (this book) notes, Russell adds “or to find some other analysis of self-
consciousness” in the revised version of KAKD (Papers 6, 149).
26 As noted previously, I think there is good reason to resist interpreting Russell’s 
remarks here, as elsewhere, as part of a Cartesian defense against skepticism. See 
Landini 2011, 300–02 and Wishon 2017.
27 As will be discussed below, Russell warns against assuming that the subjects S and 
S′ are one and the same.
28 Bostock (2012) challenges Russell’s view about self-knowledge in TK from a 
somewhat different direction. His question is this: “What grounds does one have 
for supposing that acquaintance is a two-term relation, if one of its two terms is 
never experienced?” (172). Russell’s response at the time would be that subjects 
can be introspectively acquainted with their psychological acts, and thereby be in 
a position to know their relational character, even if they lack self-acquaintance. 
Indeed, in a review of James’ Essays in Radical Empiricism, Russell remarks: “On 
the grounds of the purest empiricism, from mere inspection of experience, I for my 
part should hold it obvious that perception is in its intrinsic nature a fact of relation, 
involving an act as well as an object” (Papers 6, 303).
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29 Russell’s initial foray into this topic occurs in his unpublished 1912 manuscript 
“On Matter” (Papers, 6).
30 See Klement 2013 and Linsky 2003 and 2014 for more detailed discussions 
of Russell’s notion of “logical constructions” and its relation to the notions of 
“incomplete symbols” and “logical fictions.”
31 See Russell’s “The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics” (hereafter RSP), 145–47; 
Our Knowledge of the External World (hereafter OKEW), 110–11; and PLA, 144. 
One might challenge Russell on the issue of whether the verifiable truth of the 
reinterpreted body of knowledge has any bearing on the truth of the original body 
of knowledge. Settling those issues, however, is beyond the scope of this chapter.
32 See OKEW, 105 and 140–41; and PLA, 146.
33 See RSP, 155–56; OKEW, 107; and PLA, 144.
34 Of course, it leaves untouched the unavoidable metaphysical and epistemological 
debates about whether the unobserved world actually consists of the same kinds of 
entities as those subjects observe, assuming it exists at all.
35 Russell is explicit on this point in PLA when, after proposing the possible logical 
construction of material objects, he asserts, “I want to make clear that I am not denying 
the existence of anything [in calling it a logical fiction]; I am only refusing to affirm it. 
I refuse to affirm the existence of anything for which there is no evidence, but I equally 
refuse to deny the existence of anything against which there is no evidence” (146). It 
is also worth bearing in mind Russell’s warning in “On Matter” that “if it were known 
that the universe had been created for the purpose of delighting mathematicians, there 
would be some reason to suppose that, of two hypotheses which both fit the facts, 
the simpler is more likely to be true. As, however, there is no evidence that this is the 
purpose of the universe, there is no reason whatever to expect the [universe and its 
workings to be parsimonious]” (Papers 6, 86).
36 Presumably, a subject’s knowledge of the minds of others would be logically 
constructed from the hypothetical series of suitably related thoughts and 
experiences the subject would attribute to them based on sensory appearances 
(including of observable behavior) and analogy with the subject’s own case (OKEW, 
96). For a recent criticism of Russell’s views about inferring or constructing 
knowledge of others, see Kremer 2015.
37 There is one notable possible exception to the empirical adequacy of logical 
constructions of the self and mind: if introspection reveals psychological episodes 
to be relational, then any logical construction of them that ignores the role of the 
subject will leave this empirically discoverable fact unaccounted for. Incidentally, 
it is Russell’s coming to doubt the availability of introspective evidence for the 
relational character of psychological episodes (in addition to the subject) in his 
1919 “On Propositions” that finally convinces him to embrace (a partial) neutral 
monism. See Wishon 2015.
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38 For more on Russell’s treatment of objects as bundles, see Maclean 2014.
39 It is not quite accurate to say that image events are in the brain in OP and AMi 
since at the time Russell thinks they are parts of psychological processes but not 
physical ones. But within just a few years he adopts, and never thereafter abandons, 
his notorious belief that both images and percepts are brain events. It is also 
worth noting that Russell comes to believe that subjects do not enjoy introspective 
awareness of their desires or impulses and that “the discovery of our own motives 
can only be made by the same process by which we discover other people’s, namely, 
the process of observing our actions and inferring the desire which could prompt 
them” (AMi, 31). For more on Russell’s neutral monism, see Bostock 2012; Landini 
2011; Pincock, this book; Stubenberg 2015 and 2016; Tully 2003; and Wishon 2015. 
For more on Russell’s neutral monist theory of desire, see Griffin 2015.
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